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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent of corporate governance 
disclosure in the annual reports of listed conventional and Islamic banks in Bangladesh. Out of 
fifty-six scheduled banks in Bangladesh, a sample of thirty-nine banks is selected, and data for 
the sample is extracted from the annual reports covering a period of 2011 to 2014. As such, the 
study focused on the extent of CGC after the stock market crisis in 2010 in Bangladesh. This 
results in the final observations of 116 which were used to perform balanced panel regression 
analysis. Fixed effect model is found significant for the balanced panel model which indicates 
that appointment of large audit firms negatively affects the extent of corporate governance 
compliance. Pooled OLS regression established that while profitability has a negative influence, 
the size of banks positively affects the extent of CGC. This study has focused on the 
commercial banks and thus results obtained from the study may not be representative for public 
and foreign banks operating in Bangladesh. Statistical evidence provided by the study provides 
guidelines for the policymakers toward necessary governance reforms required for banks to 
successfully operate in a post-crisis environment. Factors established by the study that 
influences corporate governance compliance using a balanced panel model are unique in the 
context of developing countries. Evidence of a difference in governance compliance between 
Islamic and conventional banks in Bangladesh establishes a new research arena and a necessary 
shift from the traditional performance comparisons. 
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Introduction  
Corporate governance is a major concern in the South Asia-Pacific region, especially in 
the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The size and frequency of recent corporate 
governance debacles show that poor governance is not only a formidable hurdle to surmount but 
is also at the forefront of economic development issues. A dilemma has arisen from recent 
experience: it is possible for companies to appear to comply with the requisite corporate 
governance rules without complying with the principles and spirit of good governance. 
The banking sector remains of enormous importance for Bangladesh who is striving 
hard to strengthen its developing yet fragile economy. To move from the agriculture-based 
economy to an industry-based one, Bangladesh needs its banking sector, which is the single 
largest element of the financial sector, to operate at its best with utmost efficiency. Anything 
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short of that and even a slight instability in this area would wreak long-term havoc on 
Bangladesh‘s development. Moreover, sound corporate governance remains to be a key 
requirement for efficient and stable banking system. The uniqueness of banking companies and 
banking business require special corporate governance attention on a priority basis particularly 
for the developing countries where prudential regulation and supervision is inadequate to 
provide a safety net for the depositors and stakeholders of the banks. 
In Bangladesh, however, there have been no serious corporate scandals which have 
been enough to send shock waves to undermine confidence in the financial system, nor has the 
country found that it has reached the limits of conventional corporate financing mainly through 
bank lending. The country report identifies that ―the relatively low level of international 
investment in Bangladesh does not provide sufficient motivation for improving corporate 
governance, nor are there many traditional domestic motivations for improvement in corporate 
governance practices in Bangladesh‖.  
Nevertheless, that this does not mean that Bangladesh should give low priority to 
corporate governance, as there are reasons other than capital market reforms to focus on 
corporate governance. The Bangladesh country report notes the significance of corporate 
governance for a competitive private sector in a global market as well as for efficiently utilising 
domestic investment to achieve greater economic development. Good corporate governance 
practices will help develop and stimulate better business management, strategic management, 
and risk management, which, in the long-term, will make Bangladeshi businesses more 
competitive. Also, the lessons from the experience of the neighbouring countries in South Asia 
are such that Bangladesh can deploy good corporate governance to prevent the problems which 
have afflicted other countries rather than to solve them after the event. 
As is documented in this volume, in Bangladesh, failings in institutions, government 
agencies, legal enforcement, and market behaviour have resulted in weak corporate governance. 
In many cases, the current system in Bangladesh does not provide sufficient legal, institutional, 
or economic motivations for stakeholders to encourage and enforce good corporate governance 
practices. As a result, there are few rewards for companies that institute good corporate 
governance practices and no penalties for failing to do so. Targeted reforms in institutions or 
sectors can begin to provide the internal and external motivation for transparency and 
accountability that will lead to better corporate governance. 
State of Corporate Governance Practices in Bangladesh  
Corporate has become a top priority for the regulatory bodies with the objective of 
providing better and effective protection to all stakeholders and also to make the market 
confident as research reveals a positive correlation between corporate governance and share 
price. Corporate governance practices are gradually increasing among private and public 
organisations with the issuance of Corporate Governance Guidelines by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Bangladesh. The current CG Guidelines were issued on a ‗comply or 
explain‘ basis but has resulted in compliance among 66.7 percent of the companies and rest 
have compliance policy with national and international benchmarks (Khan 2006b). Khan 
(2006a) reports that the past few years have witnessed a silent inclination toward CG due to a 
variety of forces i.e. deregulation, disintermediation, institutionalisation, globalisation that are 
an acting toady and would become stronger in years to come.  
 Karim, Sarkar, & Fowzia (2010) conducted a study on fifty listed companies in 
Bangladesh and found that all companies under review reported corporate governance in the 
annual reports. The study extracted data from annual reports of 2007 with a disclosure index for 
randomly selected listed companies but limited the findings to the extent of governance 
reporting and did not provide any factors resulting in such governance disclosure. Integration of 
the Code of Corporate Governance for Bangladesh in developing a disclosure standard has 
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allowed this study to contribute to the existing literature with a possible factor of such 
compliance among two separate forms of banks in Bangladesh. 
 In an exploratory study, Wise & Ali (2009) looked into the relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility in the banking sector. Content analysis 
was used to classify the disclosures into various categories such as environment, energy, human 
resources, product and safety, community involvement and others following (Hackston and 
Milne 1996). The study found evidence of economic and public responsibility responsiveness 
emerging in the corporate social responsibility disclosures contained in the annual reports of 
Bangladesh‘s banks. Wise & Ali (2009) reported evidence of the inclusion of women within the 
boards of directors of selected banks as an indicator of bank‘s attitude towards corporate social 
responsibility.  
 Huq & Bhuiyan (2012) identified several problems relating to corporate governance 
compliance by conducting a questionnaire survey among twenty-six randomly selected banks. 
Among others, the dominance of family members in ownership structure, the mixed impact of 
accounting standards on CG, the weak regulatory system is identified as main problematic 
areas. Such limitations in CG compliance can be minimised by improving the capacity of the 
board of directors, ensuring a sound legal and regulatory framework and recommending best 
practices for corporate governance (Huq and Bhuiyan 2012).   
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Corporate governance compliance has established itself as a trending research agenda 
among researchers in various parts of the world (Gandía 2008; Lokman, Mula, and Cotter 
2011). The primary objective of this paper is to determine whether corporate governance 
mechanisms are associated with corporate governance reporting. Firms‘ Disclosure behaviours 
have already been linked with governance mechanisms by propositions of agency theory (M. C. 
C. Jensen and Meckling 1976). Corporate governance mechanisms are involved in monitoring 
and determining a firm‘s overall information disclosure policy (Kelton and Yang 2008).  
The role of governance mechanisms in determining disclosure policy may be either 
complementary or substitutive (Ho & Wong, 2001). Several governance mechanisms have been 
studied in the past literature that has a significant association with the extent and quality of 
corporate financial disclosure. Among them, board size (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006), board 
independence (Mittal 2011; G. Chau and Gray 2010), audit committee (Johl, Johl, 
Subramaniam, & Cooper, 2013) and external auditing (Firth 1979) have made their mark in the 
governance literature. Tsamenyi, Enninful-Adu, & Onumah (2007) have identified significant 
between association between disclosure and governance and disclosure practices among 22 
listed companies on the Ghanaian Stock Exchange.    
 Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, & Thomas (2012) focused on good governance practices among 
South African corporations and found a significant difference in the compliance score among 
169 listed corporations. Also, the study reports that block ownership is negatively associated 
with CG compliance, while board size and audit firm size have a positive influence on CG 
compliance. Such findings support evidence provided by (Barako 2007; Mangena and Chamisa 
2008; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Eng and Mak 2003; Tsamenyi, Enninful-Adu, and Onumah 
2007). Board independence has been left from the empirical model in the study of Ntim et al. 
(2012) which is established as a significant predictor of CGC in past literature and thus posits a 
limitation in the study. 
This limitation leads us toward the study of Parsa, Chong, & Isimoya (2007). The paper 
focuses on AIM-listed companies over a period of three years starting from 2002 and 
concentrates on their extent of compliance with the corporate governance disclosure guidelines 
as per regulations. The study reports a positive association between the board independence and 
the extent of CG disclosure. Although these findings are in line with Cheng & Courtenay (2006) 
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and Haniffa & Cooke (2002), the fact that this study on small and medium-sized companies 
(SME) do not allow us to generalise the findings for banks. 
Propositions of agency theory (Fama 1980) and signalling theory (Spence 1973) holds 
that larger audit firms have a stronger incentive to maintain their independence and to impose 
more stringent and extensive disclosure standards (DeAngelo 1981). Audit firm size has been 
suggested to have a positive influence on corporate disclosure (Eng and Mak 2003) because 
larger audit firms with greater financial capabilities can limit opportunistic activities of 
managers. As larger auditors have greater incentives to demand higher quality disclosure, the 
appointment of larger auditors for external monitoring by a company would provide a signal of 
their acceptance of demand of higher quality disclosure (Healy and Palepu 2001). Ntim, Opong, 
Danbolt, & Thomas (2012) and Ismail & El-Shaib (2012) reports such positive association 
between audit firm size and voluntary CG disclosure among South African corporations. Chau 
& Gray (2010) found audit firm size as a non-significant predictor of voluntary disclosure in 
Hong Kong and Singapore. Akhtaruddin & Haron (2010) reported a non-significant negative 
association while Barako (2007) found a significant negative association between audit firm size 
and voluntary disclosure.  
H1 : There is a positive association between audit firm size and the level of corporate 
governance compliance by banks.   
 Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, & Thomas (2012) have studied the Voluntary corporate 
governance disclosures by pose-Apartheid South African corporations and found board size to 
have a positive association with voluntary CG disclosure. While investigating Internet-based 
CG disclosure, Gandía (2008) reported similar positive association. Although Haniffa & Hudaib 
(2006) argues that larger boards have greater managerial monitoring and thus will positively 
affect disclosure and performance, Jensen (1993) argues that larger boards are associated with 
poor communication and monitoring, which can have a negative effect on disclosure and 
performance. Such argument of Jensen (1993) is backed by Chaganti (1985) and reports that the 
board size for large corporations tends to be inversely related to the degree of effective 
monitoring and extent of disclosure information to stakeholders. Ho & Williams (2003) and  
Mangena & Chamisa (2008) report no link between board size and performance. We consider a 
positive association between board size and the level of CG compliance. Hence, the following 
hypothesis is formulated:  
H2 : There is a positive association between board size and the level of corporate governance 
compliance by banks. 
The proportion of independent directors on board has been reported by researchers 
(Haniffa and Cooke 2002) to have a significant positive influence on voluntary disclosure. 
Evidence also suggests that large proportion of independent directors on board could result in 
increased conflicts and reduced disclosure (Chaganti 1985; Eng and Mak 2003). While studying 
the extent of corporate governance compliance among US SMEs, Parsa, Chong, & Isimoya 
(2007) recommended the presence of more non-executive directors. The study of Cheng & 
Courtenay  (2006) provides evidence that boards with a higher degree of independence are 
associated with higher levels of voluntary disclosures. Ho & Shun Wong (2001) have used a 
direct measure of voluntary disclosure based on analyst perception but could not identify a 
significant relationship between voluntary disclosure and board independence. Gul & Leung 
(2002) identified a negative relationship between voluntary disclosure and board independence, 
measured by a percentage of expert non-executive directors on the board. Hence, following 
hypothesis is formulated:  
H3 : There is a positive association between Board independence and the level of corporate 
governance compliance by banks. 
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Theoretical Perspective  
Agency theory introduced the conflicting relationships between two parties with the 
difference in interest (Fama and Jenses 1983; Fama 1980). The theory is concerned with 
resolving the problems between two parties, i.e. agent and principal through increased 
monitoring as the theory views agents as opportunistic. Agency theory suggests that where there 
is a separation of ownership and control of a firm, the potential for agency costs arises because 
of conflicts of interest between contracting parties (Chau & Gray, 2002). Due to greater agency 
problems (M. C. Jensen and Meckling 1976) and higher political costs (Tsamenyi, Enninful-
Adu, and Onumah 2007), firms are expected to disclose more information voluntarily. In terms 
of corporate governance disclosure, as predicted by agency theory (Leftwich, Watss, and 
Zimmerman 1981; Raffournier 1995), an active policy of disclosure on the part of the company 
can contribute to reducing the supervision cost for small shareholders and in this was will 
favour their interest in the development of the business. Traditionally, most studies of the 
principal-agent theory have focused on investor as the principal. This study focuses on the most 
relevant agency relationships for banking industry by concentrating on corporate governance 
disclosures by traditions means, i.e. annual reports. 
Managers are motivated to disclose more detailed information to support the 
continuance of their positions and remunerations and to signal institutional confidence (Gandía 
2008). Signalling theory (Spence 1973) proposes that companies become more interested in 
signalling their good position to stakeholders. The use of disclosure as a signal of firm value 
have been widely researched (Hughes 1986). Signalling theory suggests that voluntary 
disclosures are on means for companies or managers to distinguish themselves from others on 
such dimensions as quality and performance (Xiao, Yang, and Chow 2004). Inchausti (1997) 
have employed signalling theory and found that management discloses more information in the 
situation of high profits or good news than bad news. Signalling theory has been utilised in the 
investigation of voluntary internet financial (Xiao, Yang, and Chow 2004), corporate 
governance (Gandía 2008) and environmental disclosure (Joshi and Gao 2009). This study thus 
plans to implement propositions of signalling theory to understand the corporate governance 
compliance among listed banks in Bangladesh.             
Data and Research Methodology 
The sample for the study is drawn from twenty-nine banks listed on the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange as at the end of 2014 and Table 1 contains a summary of the sample selection 
procedure. There are 56 scheduled banks operating in Bangladesh. Among them, specialised, 
state-owned and foreign commercial banks are not considered while selecting the sample. 
Among 39 private commercial and Islamic banks, ten could not be selected due to lack of 
availability of required annual reports at bank websites. Thus, the final sample of the study 
consists of twenty-nine banks (21 private commercials and 8 Islamic) with four years of data for 
each bank providing a total number of 116 observations.      
The CG compliances were extracted from the sampled companies‘ annual reports 
through a self-developed disclosure index with Bangladesh Bank‘s guidelines for corporate 
governance. We set two criteria for bank selection in our final sample: the availability of a 
company‘s full four-year annual reports from 2011 to 2014 inclusive and the availability of a 
bank‘s corresponding accounting data for the same period. Following the studies of Barako 
(2007) and Eng & Mak (2003), such criteria were deemed helpful in meeting the requirements 
of a balanced panel data analysis. Panel data provides both cross-sectional and time-series 
observations, more degrees of freedom and less multicollinearity among variables (Gujarati 
2003). Thus, examination of four- year balanced panel data mat help in determining whether the 
observed cross-sectional link between voluntary CG compliance and its drivers also hold over 
time. 
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Research Methodology: Definition of Variables and Model Specification 
We have constructed a disclosure index to measure the extent of corporate governance 
compliance named (CGCI) with the guidelines provided by Bangladesh Bank. The CGCI 
contains 87 CG provisions based on the seven broad sections covering: duties to depositors and 
customers, disclosures, the board of directors, credit assessment and asset monitoring, debt 
recovery, risk management and corporate governance compliance. The CGCI is constructed by 
awarding a value of ―1‖ in any of the 87 CG provisions is disclosure in the annual report and 0 
otherwise. Thus, bank‘s CG compliance score varies between 0 to 100 percent, with higher 
index level indicating better compliance and disclosure.     
Some control variables are included in the study to reduce potential omitted variable 
bias. Independent variables included in this study are common across prior studies on CG 
compliance. Table II provides summary definitions of all variables employed, including the 
dependent (CGCI), independent and control variables. Assuming that all relationships are linear, 
our main ordinary least squares (OLS) regression equation to be estimated is specified below: 
CGCIit = α0 + β1Big5Audit + β2 BS + β3 IND + ∑    
 
   CONTROLS + εit ------------------------------------- (1) 
Where, CGCI is the CG compliance index; α0 the constant term; Big5Audit is the 
reputation of the external audit firm; BS is the board size; IND is board independence, 
CONTROLS include gearing (GEAR), firm size (SIZE), profitability (ROA); ε the error term. 
Empirical results relating to the descriptive statistics and panel regression results are discussed 
in the following section of the paper.         
Empirical Results  
Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 provides a summary of descriptive statistics for all variables included in our analysis. 
Board size ranges from a minimum of 6 to maximum 22; leverage ranges from -3.37 to 24.17 
and size ranges from 23.36 to 27.20. The figure of audit quality and board independence as well 
as control variables includes substantial variations, hence minimising possibilities of sample 
selection bias. Corporate governance compliance score has a standard deviation of 0.28 while 
having a mean score of 0.66. This indicates on average banks comply 66 percent of the 87 CG 
provisions examined. Correlations table provided in Table IV indicates that there is some degree 
of correlations among independent and dependent variables, thus indicating toward a valid 
regression model.  
Table 1: Summary of descriptive statistics of all variables for all (116) firm years 
 
 Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis 
BID5AUD 0.69 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.46 -0.82 1.67 
BS 14.28 14.00 22.00 6.00 4.24 -0.13 2.58 
CGCS 0.66 0.76 1.01 0.00 0.28 -1.30 3.50 
GEAR 9.60 10.25 24.17 -3.37 4.59 -0.48 5.37 
IND 1.48 2.00 4.00 0.00 1.20 0.22 2.31 
ROA 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.10 0.02 -4.96 32.58 
SIZE 25.66 25.70 27.20 23.36 0.57 -1.58 9.26 
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Multivariate Regression Analysis 
Table 2 reports the reports the panel data regression analysis of the determinants of CG 
compliance. The study has utilised pooled, fixed effect and random effect designs. Column 3 
and 4 provides the pooled OLS regression results. It can be observed that audit quality has a 
significant negative impact on corporate governance compliance while board size and board 
independence are found to be non-significant predictors of CG compliance. Among the control 
variables, ROA has a negative impact while size has a positive impact on CG compliance. 
Leverage is found to have a non-significant impact on CG compliance.  
Table 2: Regression analysis of the determinants of Corporate Governance Compliance 
  OLS Fixed Effect Random Effect 
 Predicted 
Sign 
β P β P β P 
Independent Variables        
BID5AUD + -0.132 0.017** -0.120 0.005** -0.132 0.019** 
BS -/+ -0.001 0.927 0.002 0.772 -0.001 0.839 
IND + -0.015 0.501 -0.007 0.699 -0.016 0.476 
Control Variables        
GEAR -  0.001 0.854 -0.002 0.693 0.001 0.849 
ROA + -4.305 0.047** 0.891 0.611 -4.485 0.029** 
SIZE + 0.189 0.002** 0.031 0.527 0.209 0.000*** 
Constant  -3.992 .007** -0.030 0.980 0.209 0.002** 
Standard Error  0.263 0.202 0.265 
Durbin-Watson Statistics  1.505 1.274 1.581 
F-Value  2.618** 11.016** 2.676** 
Adjusted R
2
  0.090 .466 0.088 
Number of Observations  116 116 116 
Note: ***, ** and * significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively 
Column 5 and 6 provides the fixed effect regression results. It can be observed that only 
audit quality has a significant negative impact on corporate governance compliance while all 
other variables are found to be non-significant predictors of CG compliance. The random effect 
regression provides many similar results compared to the pooled OLS regression results. It is 
observed that the adjusted R
2 
is highest for fixed effect model (.466) while lowest for the 
random effect model (0.088). Next, Hausman test is performed to determine whether fixed or 
random effect model is significant for the study. Table VI indicates with significant value that 
fixed effect model provides better estimates for the developed balanced panel regression model. 
Table 4: Hausman Test Results 
Test Summary 
 
Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
Cross-section random 
 
25.265 3.000 0.000 
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Moderation Analysis 
The moderation influence of the nature of banks on the extent of corporate governance 
compliance was tested using the expand command in Views. A dummy variable was created 
with a score of 1 for Islamic banks and 0 for conventional banks. Equation 2 provides the 
modified regression equation with the mediator. Regression results provided in Table VI 
indicates a significant moderating effect of the nature of the Bank.   
CGCIit = α0 + β1Big5Audit + β2 BS + β3 DUAL + β4 IND + β4 Moderator + ∑    
 
   CONTROLS 
+ εit ------- (2) 
 
Table 5: Test of Moderation of the nature of bank 
 β P 
Independent Variables   
BID5AUD -0.147 0.007*** 
BS 0.002 0.817 
IND -0.016 0.449 
Islamic = 1 (Moderator) -0.127 0.038** 
Control Variables   
GEAR 0.004 0.477 
ROA -6.130 0.008*** 
SIZE 0.188 0.001*** 





Number of Observations 116 
 
Note: ***, ** and * significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively 
 The constant tells us that if all variables were equal to zero, we would expect the extent 
of corporate governance compliance to decrease by 14.7 percent for Islamic Banks. The 
coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant, indicating that corporate 
governance compliance is 12.7 percent lower for Islamic banks compared to conventional 
banks. Evidence of such low level of governance compliance can be seen from corporate 
governance compliance score provided in Table VII (see the appendix). It is also observed from 
the OLS regression results that, audit quality and profitability play a negative role in the extent 
of CGC for Islamic banks while size positively affects CGC. The modified model was able to 
predict 118 percent of the variations in the extent of CGC.         
Summary and Conclusion 
This paper has aimed at determining the factors that influence corporate governance 
factors among listed banks in Bangladesh. Also, the moderating impact of the nature of bank is 
provided to analyse whether there is a difference in the extent of governance compliance 
between Islamic and conventional banks. Seven hypothesis were formulated to test the impact 
of governance and firm-specific constructs on dependent variable (corporate governance 
compliance). 
H1 states that audit firm size has a positive association with corporate governance 
compliance by banks. Both OLS and fixed effect regression results have indicated toward a 
negative association between these two variables in the context of Bangladesh. So, hypothesis 
H1 is rejected. However, these results provide justification to the results found by Barako 
(2007). In hypothesis H2 the second governance variable, board size, is introduced and 
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hypothesised to have a positive association between the level of corporate governance 
compliance. Table V indicates toward a non-significant association which is similar to the 
findings of Ho & Williams (2003) and  Mangena & Chamisa (2008). As a result, H2 is rejected. 
H3 introduced a positive association between board independence and governance compliance. 
The non-significant association is found through balanced panel regression and thus H3 is 
rejected.  
Three firm-specific variables, i.e. leverage, profitability and size were also introduced in 
the regression model. H5 states that leverage has a negative association with the level of 
governance compliance by banks. Fixed effect model in Table V provides a non-significant 
negative association and thus H5 is rejected. Profitability is hypothesised to have a positive 
impact on CGC in H6. Although Ismail & El-Shaib (2012) reported a positive association, this 
study validates the negative association between profitability and corporate governance 
compliance following Xiao et al. (2004). Finally, H7 states that size of the bank has a positive 
influence on the extent of CGC. Table V provide justification toward this claim by providing a 
significant positive result. Thus, H7 is accepted. 
The study has ended with a moderation analysis by a dichotomous variable. The new 
variable Islamic had values 1 for all Islamic banks and 0 for all conventional banks. Due to the 
smaller amount of observations for Islamic banks, separate regression was not conducted. 
Instead, the moderation analysis was conducted in EVIEWS using the @expand command. 
Table VI provides the OLS regression results for the modified equation with a moderating 
variable. The model was found to have a significant negative impact of CGC which indicates 
that the nature of the bank moderates the extent of corporate governance compliance. The level 
of CGC is decreased for Islamic banks as compared to conventional Banks which is evident 
from the scores obtained from the CGC index (see Table VII in the appendix). 
This study has made several contributions to the governance literature. First, the 
propositions of agency theory that higher governance mechanism will lead to increased 
compliance is not found valid for banks operating in Bangladesh. The negative association of 
external audit size with governance compliance indicates that banks appointing big audit firms 
for annual audit function are less motivated to comply with the central bank governance 
compliance guidelines. It is a relief to see that big banks are complying more with the 
governance standards but while isolating the profitability issue, we can see that banks with 
higher profits are not the one with the highest compliance score. The agency conflict is evident 
in this scenario as the profit maximisation goal of a manager is affecting their decision toward 
governance compliance which is beneficial for the stakeholders. So, central banks should be 
focusing on enforcing strict laws to ensure a greater level of governance compliance among not 
only bigger but also profitable banks in Bangladesh.  
Finally, the difference in governance compliance between Islamic and conventional 
banks, more specifically, the lower level of compliance among Islamic banks has established a 
separate research agenda which could not be discussed in this paper. The primary reason is that 
the index used to determine the governance compliance have focused on the conventional issues 
while a separate index grounded with Maqasid-Al-Shariah framework might provide better 
results for Islamic banks.              
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